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Abstract According to what I call the ‘Vagueness Thesis’ (‘VT’) about belief,
‘believes’ is a vague predicate. On this view, our concept of belief admits of
borderline cases: one can ‘half-believe’ something (Price in Belief, George Allen &
Unwin, London, 1969) or be ‘in-between believing’ it (Schwitzgebel in Philos Q
51:76–82, 2001, Nouˆs 36:249–275, 2002, Pac Philos Q 91:531–553, 2010). In this
article, I argue that VT is false and present an alternative picture of belief. I begin by
considering a case—held up as a central example of vague belief—in which
someone sincerely claims something to be true and yet behaves in a variety of other
ways as if she believes that it is not. I argue that, even from the third-person
perspective prioritised by proponents of VT, the case does not motivate VT. I
present an alternative understanding of the case according to which the person in
question believes as they say they do yet also has a belief-discordant implicit
attitude otherwise. Moreover, I argue that, independently of the interpretation of any
particular case, VT fails to accommodate the first-person perspective on belief.
Belief is not only an item of one’s psychology that helps explain one’s behaviour; it
is what one takes to be true. This fact about belief manifests itself in the nature of
deliberation concerning whether to believe something and that of introspection
regarding whether one believes something. Attending to these phenomena reveals
that VT is not merely unmotivated, but untenable.
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1 Introduction
Belief attribution is not always easy. In fact, there are lots of different kinds of cases
in which it is extremely contentious what someone believes. Imagine someone who
ordinarily avoids walking under ladders because of the associated bad luck but who,
when about to miss her train, runs straight under one without hesitation. Or,
someone who sincerely prays to God in church on Sundays but lives an apparently
secular life for the rest of the week. Price (1969) uses these kinds of examples in
order to motivate his view that it is possible to ‘half-believe’ something—that
walking under ladders is unlucky or that God exists, for example. More recently,
Schwitzgebel (2001, 2002, 2010) has presented a similar range of cases which he
insists are best interpreted in terms of ‘in-between belief’. In this article I will argue,
contra Price and Schwitzgebel, that ‘believes’ is not a vague predicate.
I will open in Sect. 2 by outlining the ‘Vagueness Thesis’ (‘VT’) I am opposing
in more detail. In Sect. 3, I will begin my critique of VT by examining one of
Schwitzgebel’s central motivating cases from the third-person perspective of the
belief attributor prioritised by Price and Schwitzgebel: the case of Juliet, who
sincerely claims something to be true and yet behaves in a variety of other ways as if
she believes that it is not. I will argue that, even from the third-person perspective,
the case does not motivate VT, which is naturally understood in terms of Juliet’s
believing as she claims and yet possessing a belief-discordant implicit attitude in
addition to her belief. Furthermore, I will argue that there is a moral to be extracted
from my discussion of VT’s interpretation of this case, which generalises to other
cases cited by Price and Schwitzgebel. At any given time, each person has an
uncountably large number and a wide variety of mental states which, taken together,
help explain their behaviour. Their complicated behavioural output can readily be
understood, even from the third-person perspective, in terms of many states, which
sometimes interact and overlap. As such, their behaviour does not motivate the idea
that it is vague whether or not they believe something. Nonetheless, for all that I will
say in this second section, VT is simply unmotivated by a central case and some
others like it. It remains tenable and potentially motivated by some other kind of
case. It is in Sect. 4 that I will turn to arguing that VT is untenable. I will maintain
that belief is a janus-faced phenomenon. On the one hand, from the third-person
perspective, a belief is a psychological state that helps explain the believer’s
behaviour. On the other, from what I will call the ‘first-person perspective’, a belief
is the believer’s view on the world: what they take to be true.1 Any satisfactory
account of belief must accommodate both of these faces. As I will have argued, VT
is unmotivated even when it comes to accommodating belief’s third-personal face,
with which it is concerned. But as I will argue in Sect. 4, it is untenable when it
comes to accommodating belief’s first-personal face. In the final analysis, it is VT’s
inability to accommodate the first-person perspective on belief that decides between
1 Strictly, on my view, one’s belief is what one takes to be true in a certain manner, namely, in a manner
that is correct if and only if its contents are true (see Archer 2017). In what follows I will simply talk
about what one ‘takes to be true’ as shorthand for the completed version.
3030 S. Archer
123
an interpretation of a case such as Juliet’s involving vague belief and an
interpretation such as my own, which does accommodate belief’s first-personal face.
2 ‘Believes’ as a vague predicate
Vagueness is the phenomenon of imprecise classification. If a term is vague, it has
what we might call ‘borderline’ cases. ‘Bald’ is a classic example. If it is vague
whether to say of a particular individual that they are ‘bald’, this is because there is
no precise number of hairs they need have (or lack) in order to count as bald. It is
possible to be a bit bald or ‘balding’ as one might more naturally put it in English.
‘VT’ is the claim that ‘believes’ is vague. According to VT our concept of belief
admits of borderline cases: one can ‘half-believe’ something or be ‘in-between
believing’ it.
Price (1969, p. 302) claims:
We quite often say of another person that he half-believes such and such a
proposition though he does not wholly believe it. Sometimes we even say such
things about ourselves, usually in the past tense. ‘I see now that at that time I
only half-believed what he told me.’ I did not quite believe it, but I did not
disbelieve it; and yet I was not in a state of suspended judgement about it
either. My attitude was one which came fairly close to believing and yet did
not go all the way; or it had some of the characteristics of believing, but lacked
others.
According to Price (1969, p. 312):
A half-belief… seems to be something which is ‘thrown off’ when
circumstances alter. In some sorts of contexts one is in a belief-like state
with regard to a proposition, but in others one disbelieves it or just disregards
it.
More recently, Schwitzgebel (2001, 2002, 2010) has presented a very similar
position according to which there are cases that:
…should be regarded as ‘in-between’ cases of believing, in which it’s neither
quite right to ascribe the belief in question nor quite right to say that the person
lacks the belief. (Schwitzgebel 2010, p. 531)
However, his position is more ambitious than Price’s. Schwitzgebel thinks that
cases in which someone appears to believe something in one context and then not in
another are just one kind of example of in-between believing. Cases like ‘Juliet’
represent another:
[Juliet is]… a Caucasian-American philosophy professor. [She]… has
critically examined the literature on racial differences in intelligence,
and…finds the case for racial equality compelling. She is prepared to argue
coherently, sincerely, and vehemently for equality of intelligence and has
argued the point repeatedly in the past. And yet…[she] is systematically racist
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in most of her spontaneous reactions, her unguarded behaviour and her
judgments about particular cases… Juliet could even be perfectly aware of
these facts about herself; she could aspire to reform; self-deception could be
largely absent. We can imagine that sometimes Juliet deliberately strives to
overcome her bias in particular cases. She sometimes tries to interpret black
students’ comments especially generously. But it’s impossible to constantly
maintain such self-conscious vigilance, and of course patronizing condescen-
sion, which her well-intentioned efforts sometimes become, itself reflects
apparent implicit assumptions about intelligence. (Schwitzgebel 2010, p. 532)
Whether or not Juliet appears to believe that the races are intellectually equal does
not simply vary from context to context:
…it seems possible for Juliet in a single moment both to be having a racist
reaction and to be sincerely judging that the races are intellectually equal – for
example, when she’s having a racist reaction and trying to suppress it or when
she’ s grading a black student’s essay on intellectual equality, undervaluing
the essay but regarding its conclusions as true. (Schwitzgebel 2010, p. 543)
Indeed, Schwitzgebel thinks that belief’s vagueness is revealed by a great many
more types of case besides those involving contextual variation and cases of implicit
bias such as Juliet’s. Other examples include those involving partial forgetting such
as a partially forgotten phone number, cases of self-deception, and cases of what
Schwitzgebel (2002, p. 265) calls ‘peripheral ignorance’ such as that of Kripke’s
(1979) Pierre who will assent to the sentence ‘Londres est jolie’ but also to the
sentence ‘London is ugly’, not realising that ‘Londres’ and ‘London’ refer to the
same city.2
VT, as I will be understanding it then, is not restricted in application to cases in
which whether someone believes something appears to vary from context to context.
Rather, according to VT, it is vague whether or not someone believes something
under any circumstances in which they satisfy the criteria for holding the belief in
question to some significant extent, but not sufficiently to count as believing it
simpliciter.3 VT is compatible with different views regarding the metaphysics of
belief, as Schwitzgebel (2010, pp. 535–536) points out. Price and Schwitzgebel are
2 Schwitzgebel (see e.g. 2002, p. 264), unlike Price (1969, pp. 302–304), includes degrees of belief, or
‘credences’ as they are sometimes called, as a type of vague belief. It is important to note, however, that
in denying VT I do not commit myself to denying the reality of degrees of belief. For example, it is
coherent to maintain that one who holds credence 0.6 in a proposition simply does not believe it outright;
it is not vague whether or not they do. Rowbottom (2007, 2016) argues, contra Schwitzgebel, that Juliet’s
case—that I will soon be discussing – should be understood as involving (sometimes rapidly) fluctuating
degrees of belief in response to changes in information, mood, or other attitudes, or a combination of
these variables. Schwitzgebel understands the disagreement between himself and Rowbottom as one
about which kind of vague belief can account for Juliet’s case: the degrees of belief kind or another kind.
But it need not be understood in this way. It can be understood as a debate about whether or not Juliet’s
belief is vague or whether she has fluctuating degrees of belief (not understood as a type of vague belief).
3 There is of course a worry here about how to understand ‘significant’ and ‘sufficiently’. Schwitzgebel
(e.g. 2002, p. 253) claims that these are matters to be determined by the belief ascriber but this does not
strike me as a claim to which VT is necessarily wed.
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both dispositionalists about belief. They think that what it is to believe something is
to satisfy what Schwitzgebel (e.g. 2002, p. 251) calls a ‘‘dispositional stereotype’’:
roughly, to be disposed to behave in various ways associated with that belief. (For
Price and Schwitzgebel, this includes dispositions to behave ‘internally’ in certain
ways, such as the disposition to ‘inwardly assent’ to the content of the belief in
question, to feel surprise upon discovering its falsity etc.) Dispositionalism appears
to lend itself to VT, which translates on a dispositionalist metaphysics as the claim
that if someone possesses a significant number of the dispositions pertinent to their
holding a particular belief (bearing in mind that some dispositions are more central
to the stereotype than others), but not sufficiently many to count as believing it
simpliciter, it is vague whether or not they believe it. A functionalist metaphysics of
belief seems to sit equally comfortably with VT. For a functionalist about belief,
roughly speaking, what it is to believe something is to be in a state that occupies a
certain functional role, so VT translates as the claim that if someone’s state occupies
this role to some significant extent but not sufficiently for belief simpliciter it is
vague whether or not they hold the belief in question. Pairing VT with
representationalism is slightly more forced. If believing that p constitutively
involves representing that p in a certain way, a vague belief would need to involve
some kind of partial representation. In the discussion that follows, I will attempt to
discuss VT independently of any particular metaphysics of belief. The discussion of
Juliet’s case centres on her (external) behaviour but can be interpreted variously
depending upon one’s metaphysics. For dispositionalists such as my opponents the
discussion is one about Juliet’s dispositions to behave, understood as constituting
either her vague belief or her belief. But for a representationalist about belief, for
example, the discussion of Juliet’s behaviour and which dispositions to behave she
possesses can be understood as a discussion of the evidence regarding her belief
state. Before I turn to this discussion, it is important to note that according to VT,
just as growth from any given hair follicle is neither necessary nor sufficient for
categorising someone as ‘not bald’, whatever the criteria for S’s believing that p are
understood to be, meeting any individual criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient
for S’s believing that p. As Schwitzgebel (2002, p. 252) puts it in accordance with
his dispositionalist metaphysics:
No one disposition is either necessary or sufficient for the possession of any
belief.
3 Juliet, from the third-person perspective
Both Price and Schwitzgebel cite a wide variety of cases in support of VT, far too
many to do justice to here. Rather than try, my approach in this section will be to
focus on one of Schwitzgebel’s central motivating cases and argue in detail that,
even from the third-person perspective on belief prioritised by Price and
Schwitzgebel, the case does not motivate VT. Nonetheless, I will conclude the
section by discussing a moral that can be drawn from my treatment of this case,
which generalises to some of the other cases cited by Price and Schwitzgebel.
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According to Schwitzgebel, Juliet, the implicit racist, provides us with a prime
example of the vagueness of belief. She resembles someone who believes that the
races are intellectually equal to some significant extent but not enough to classify
her as holding the belief simpliciter: it is vague whether or not she believes that they
are. I will begin my case against this interpretation by arguing that she does not
simply resemble someone who believes that the races are intellectually equal in
some ways and not in others. There is a pattern in her behaviour, which simply
claiming it to be vague whether or not she believes that the races are intellectually
equal fails to capture. What is the pattern in Juliet’s behaviour? In reflecting upon
whether or not the races are intellectually equal, Juliet consistently behaves as if she
believes in the intellectual equality of the races. She argues the point ‘‘coherently,
sincerely, and vehemently’’ and even makes attempts to bring the rest of her
behaviour into line. In reflecting upon the question at hand she would never behave
as if she lacked the belief that the races are intellectually equal. And in the rest of
her behaviour—which does not involve her reflecting on the question as to whether
the races are intellectually equal—she mostly fails to resemble one who believes
that they are. All of Juliet’s behaviour in reflecting upon the question at hand hangs
together, as does most of her behaviour in not reflecting on this question.
Furthermore, in not reflecting upon this question, for the most part, it is not as if
Juliet simply fails to resemble one who believes that the races are intellectually
equal. In fact, she behaves as if she is positively of the view that the races are not
intellectually equal.
Merely claiming it to be vague whether or not Juliet believes that the races are
intellectually equal does nothing to explain her behaviour that points to her being
positively of the opposing view. Furthermore, all that the claim that it is vague
whether she believes that the races are intellectually equal involves is that she
resembles such a believer in some ways and not in others, it does not specify which.
So, it is consistent with its being vague whether she holds the belief in question that
on some occasions Juliet asserts it to be false that the races are intellectually equal,
on others, argues for the opposite conclusion, for example.
Insofar as it is true of Juliet that she resembles someone who believes that the
races are not intellectually equal to some extent, VT would presumably be
committed to claiming that it is vague whether or not she believes this too. But
regardless as to whether the claim is that it is vague whether or not Juliet believes
that the races are intellectually equal or that in addition to this it is vague whether or
not she believes that it is not the case that this is so, the pattern in Juliet’s behaviour
remains unexplained. Augmenting the picture with an additional vague belief gets
us no closer to capturing the pattern in Juliet’s behaviour. Again, it is consistent with
claiming that it is vague whether she possesses both of the contradictory beliefs in
question that some of her behaviour in reflecting upon whether or not the races are
intellectually equal points in the direction of her believing that they are and some in
the direction of her believing that they are not. But Juliet does not behave in such an
apparently random fashion.
In failing to capture the pattern in Juliet’s behaviour, simply appealing to vague
belief also fails to capture what is normatively problematic about Juliet’s case. Not
only does she behave in some respects as if she believes that the races are
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intellectually equal and in some respects as if she believes that they are not, this is
indicative of what is normatively problematic about her situation. Indeed, she
recognises this: she aspires to reform, to bring all of her behaviour into line with her
judgement that the races are intellectually equal.4
I will now present an alternative understanding of Juliet’s case which, pace
Schwitzgebel, does do justice to her normatively problematic behavioural pattern.
This is what Schwitzgebel (2010) calls the ‘‘pro-judgment view’’ but I will call the
‘belief-implicit attitude’ picture. On this picture, Juliet does believe that the races
are intellectually equal simpliciter but, in addition to this belief, she has some kind
of implicit attitude to the effect that they are not. There is a growing literature
devoted to trying to understand the precise nature of the kind of implicit attitude
involved in implicit bias cases such as Juliet’s. Zimmerman (2007) claims them to
be habits. Tamar Gendler (e.g. 2008, p. 552) famously calls them ‘aliefs’; an alief is
‘‘…an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a
particular way’’. Levy (2015) thinks that they should rather be thought of as non-
associational ‘patchy endorsements’. I will not attempt to settle the question as to
the precise naure of Juliet’s implicit attitude here.5
On my proposed belief-implicit attitude understanding of her case, Juliet does
believe that the races are intellectually equal simpliciter: she is disposed to behave
in all of the ways one who believes that the races are intellectually equal is disposed
to behave. However, only some of these dispositions—to assert that they are, to
argue that they are etc.—are actualised. Some of the relevant dispositions to
behave—those that pertain to her behaviour in not reflecting upon the question of
the intellectual equality of the races—are not actualised. But there is an explanation
as to why they are not actualised. They are not actualised because in addition to
Juliet’s belief that the races are intellectually equal she also possesses a belief-
discordant implicit attitude that blocks her dispositions to behave as if she believes
that the races are intellectually equal when not reflecting upon the question at hand.
The implicit attitude in this case in fact causes her to behave as if she is of the
opposing view. Any plausible dispositional attribution must include a ceteris
paribus clause, such that the disposition in question is only expected to be actualised
all else being equal (as Schwitzgebel of course acknowledges). The suggestion here
is that not all of Juliet’s dispositions to behave associated with her belief that the
4 Borgoni (2016, pp. 51–52) wonders whether Juliet’s normative difficulties might be understood in
accordance with VT in terms of her failure to fully form the belief that the races are intellectually equal.
Juliet should believe this simpliciter (on the basis of her epistemic reasons) and yet it is merely vague
whether she does. I agree with Borgoni that this attempt to capture what is normatively problematic about
Juliet’s situation does not seem to get her case right. Her normative difficulties lie in the conflict
manifested in the fact that some of her behaviour suggests that she believes that the races are
intellectually equal and some that she positively regards them as not being so.
5 Some even argue that the implicit attitudes in question are beliefs (see e.g. Borgoni 2016; Mandelbaum
2016). Of course, much more would need to be said about the detail of this belief-implicit attitude picture
in order to fully account for why Juliet behaves as she does. Nonetheless, we have an outline of an
explanation of the pattern in Juliet’s behaviour (on which I will shortly elaborate further), which simply
appealing to a vague belief on her part, or even two vague beliefs, is incapable of providing.
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races are intellectually equal are actualised because all else is not equal for Juliet; in
addition to her belief, she has a belief-discordant implicit attitude.6
On my view, Juliet’s case is comparable with a case that I will call ‘Precipice’,
versions of which were discussed by the early moderns (see e.g. Hume 1978, p. 100;
Montaigne 1957, p. 250). Here is Gendler’s (2008, p. 634) contemporary example:
In March 2007, 4000 feet above the floor of the Grand Canyon, a horseshoe-
shaped cantilevered glass walkway was opened to the public. Extending 70
feet from the Canyon’s rim, the Grand Canyon Skywalk soon drew hundreds
of visitors each day…‘[who know]… what sensation is being promised… The
promise is the dizzying thrill of vertigo. And indeed, last week some visitors to
this steel supported walkway anchored in rock felt precisely that. One woman,
her left hand desperately grasping the 60-inch-high glass sides and the other
clutching the arm of a patient security guard, didn’t dare move toward the
transparent center of the walkway.’ (Rothstein, The New York Times, 19th
May 2007)
In defending the claim that Juliet and Precipice are comparable, I will now defend
my claim that there is a significant pattern in Juliet’s behaviour against
Schwitzgebel’s (2010) denial that this is so.
One might think that the proponent of VT would claim it to be vague whether the
woman here believes herself to be safe. She resembles someone who does in some
important ways—she gets up on the walkway in the first place, for example—but
not entirely—she won’t dare move towards the centre. However, just as with Juliet,
there is a pattern in this woman’s behaviour that the claim that it is vague whether
she believes herself to be safe would not capture. In this case, the key instance of
relevant reflective behaviour is the fact that she puts herself in this situation. And
yet, analogously to Juliet, not only does she fail to resemble someone who believes
herself to be safe, she also behaves unreflectively largely as if she is positively of the
view that she is unsafe, she grasps the sides, clutches the security guard’s arm, and
won’t dare move towards the centre. Just as in Juliet’s case, this behaviour is
6 Precisely how to understand ceteris paribus clauses is a complex and controversial matter. My thanks
to an anonymous referee for this journal for encouraging me to discuss the matter in a little more depth
here. Schurz (2002) suggests distinguishing between a ‘comparative’ understanding of when a ceteris
paribus clause can be invoked and an ‘exclusive’ one. On a comparative understanding, a ceteris paribus
clause added to the conditional statement of a disposition requires that phenomena not mentioned in either
the antecedent or the consequent remain unchanged. On an exclusive understanding, a ceteris paribus
clause requires that certain phenomena are not present. I have the latter understanding of ceteris paribus
clauses in mind. All else is not equal for Juliet not necessarily in the sense that some other factor has
changed, but rather in the sense that there is some interfering factor: her implicit attitude. Schwitzgebel
(2002, pp. 253–257) seems to have a similar understanding of ceteris paribus clauses in mind.
Furthermore, in discussing the kinds of ‘‘excusing conditions’’ that legitimate the invocation of a relevant
ceteris paribus clause, he of course includes the existence of other mental states, such as a desire, for
example (e.g. p. 254). But he notes: ‘‘…of course there must be limits to such excusers. Otherwise, we
could save any generalization or dispositional ascription we wished simply by excusing every
counterinstance. Articulating the principles underwriting the limits on excusing conditions is a difficult
task… (I’d say, roughly, that when a candidate excusing condition would undermine the potential
usefulness of the generalization we should reject it as an excuser.)’’ (Schwitzgebel 2010, p. 534) I will
now argue that Juliet’s implicit attitude passes this test for legitimate excusing conditions.
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suggestive of two mental states at work. In this case, the woman believes that she is
safe simpliciter but some of her dispositions to behave as if she is are blocked from
being actualised by her instinctive fear at such a great height. This fear explains her
grasping the sides, clutching the security guard’s arm and not daring to move
towards the centre.
Interestingly, Schwitzgebel (2010, p. 549) admits in a footnote that Precipice is
not a case of vague belief:
I would not deny that the man who stands trembling on a glass floor high in the
air still believes that the glass floor is solid and can support him, to use one of
Gendler’s examples. The difference between this case and the cases I’ve
presented is that in my cases there is a broad range of dispositions that deviate
from the dispositional profile characteristic of the endorsed judgment, while in
the glass-floor case the deviation is narrow and arguably excused. Especially
relevant here are cognitive dispositions – dispositions to make certain
inferences and to reach certain related judgments (e.g. in Juliet’s case about
the quality of an applicant or student) that show little parallel between the two
types of case.
So, Schwitzgebel claims that Precipice and Juliet are importantly different. In
particular, he points to the fact that Juliet makes certain inferences and
judgements—for example regarding the quality of an individual applicant or
student—that deviate from those she would make were she to believe the races to be
intellectually equal simpliciter. Schwitzgebel’s (2010, p. 541) thought, which he
emphasises elsewhere, is that it is not as if there is a neat divide between all of
Juliet’s automatic behaviour and all of her judgements and reflective behaviour. She
judges that the races are intellectually equal consistently, but she also makes
judgements in specific cases, such as ‘This student doesn’t seem very bright’, which
are out of keeping with her view on the intellectual equality of the races. It is not
just her knee-jerk behaviour that fails to fall into line. Similarly, we can imagine that
sometimes she responds unthinkingly as if the races are intellectually equal too. So,
on Schwitzgebel’s view, Precipice is distinct from Juliet insofar as in Precipice,
unlike Juliet, there is a neat pattern of ‘narrow’ deviation from the behaviour we
would expect such that the woman can still be said to believe that she is safe but is
also simply afraid.
However, the pattern I have identified in Juliet’s behaviour is not one in which
all of her reflective behaviour hangs together, as do all of her knee-jerk reactions.
It is more subtle than that. Rather, my claim is that in reflecting on the question
of the intellectual equality of the races, Juliet consistently behaves as if the races
are intellectually equal. She would never assert that this is not so, for example.
Furthermore, most of her unreflective behaviour is as if she is positively of the
view that the races are not intellectually equal. This is the pattern in Juliet’s
behaviour that the claim that it is vague whether or not Juliet believes that the
races are intellectually equal does not help us capture. Appealing to a belief
simpliciter plus some kind of belief-discordant implicit attitude does capture the
pattern.
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But why the subtlety in the pattern? Why does Juliet sometimes make ‘racist’
judgements and sometimes react automatically in an egalitarian manner?7 Let’s
begin with the former. Juliet’s judgement that a particular black student ‘doesn’t
seem that bright’ for example, is entirely compatible with the belief-implicit attitude
picture. Indeed, the belief-implicit attitude picture has an explanation of such
judgements that merely claiming Juliet has one (or two) vague beliefs lacks:
namely, these judgements are influenced, outside of Juliet’s conscious awareness,
by her implicit attitude. Pace Schwitzgebel (2010, pp. 538–541), the belief-implicit
attitude picture of Juliet’s case does not fail to recognise that beliefs are not always
(or perhaps not even for the most part) pure responses to one’s epistemic reasons
(those reasons that one understands to pertain to the truth of the matter). On
Schwitzgebel’s view, according to the belief-implicit attitude picture, a line is
drawn between all of Juliet’s reflective behaviour and all of her automatic responses
and her reflective behaviour is simplistically understood to be purely responsive to
her epistemic reasons and therein tied to belief. However, as I have just explained,
the pattern I have identified is not a straightforward divide such that all of Juliet’s
reflective behaviour hangs together in contrast to all of her automatic behaviour. But
neither is the belief-implicit attitude picture committed to conceiving of all of
Juliet’s judgements as formed purely on the basis of her epistemic reasons. The
influence of her implicit attitude upon some of her judgements—that the black
student ‘doesn’t seem that bright’, for example—may be a case in point.
As for Juliet’s egalitarian unthinking behaviour, again, this is perfectly in keeping
with the view that she believes that the races are intellectually equal and yet has a
belief-discordant implicit attitude otherwise. After all, one’s beliefs express
themselves in one’s unthinking behaviour. Indeed, in the ‘good’ case, where there
is no conflicting attitude, I simply believe that p and all of my relevant behaviour
(both reflective and otherwise) evinces this belief; all of my dispositions to behave
associated with this belief are actualised. Nonetheless, in Juliet’s case, a significant
portion of her unreflective behaviour (as well as some judgements about particular
cases, as we have seen) betray her implicit attitude to the effect that the races are not
intellectually equal.8
It is important to stress that on the belief-implicit attitude picture of Juliet’s case I
am defending, someone’s unreflective behaviour is pertinent to whether or not they
believe something. Indeed, someone who believes that p is answerable for whether
or not they behave unreflectively as if they do. Pace Schwitzgebel (see e.g. 2010,
pp. 538–541), the view, as I am understanding it, is not committed to some kind of
‘intellectualism’ about belief, such that one’s unreflective behaviour is of no
7 I put ‘racist’ in quotation marks here as whether to attribute racism proper in cases of implicit bias such
as Juliet’s is controversial and intimately connected to the question as to the nature of the attitudes held by
the person in question (see Levy 2015).
8 As an anonymous referee for this journal pointed out, it is of course trivially true that someone’s
behaviour always falls into some pattern or other and there may be some legitimate disagreement as to
whether a particular pattern is sufficiently suggestive of a given combination of mental states.
Nonetheless, in Juliet’s case I think the pattern in her behaviour is sufficiently suggestive of the belief-
implicit attitude picture.
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consequence when it comes to what one believes. My suggestion is not that it is
clear from Juliet’s behaviour that she is merely disposed to behave as if she believes
that the races are intellectually equal when reflecting upon the question at hand and
that this is sufficient for attributing to her the belief that the races are intellectually
equal regardless of all of her other behaviour. As aforementioned, on the belief-
implicit attitude view, Juliet does possess all of the dispositions to behave as if she
believes that the races are intellectually equal simpliciter but some of them are
blocked from being actualised. And, indeed, as the belief-implicit attitude view
acknowledges, her case is normatively problematic insofar as this is so.
So, I have argued that there is a significant pattern in Juliet’s behaviour that the
belief-implicit attitude picture can make sense of and that in so doing it is not
committed to the claim that beliefs are formed solely on the basis of epistemic
reasons or that a person’s unreflective behaviour is of no consequence when it
comes to belief attribution. Before I conclude this section with an eye to some of
Price and Schwitzgebel’s other cases, it is important to address a potential line of
response on behalf of VT.
Attributing dispositions to behave on the basis of actual behaviour is a delicate
matter under any circumstances and one might worry about the grounds for claiming
that Juliet posesses all of the dispositions to behave associated with the belief that the
races are intellectually equal. Perhaps, as I have argued, one must acknowledge that
the pattern in Juliet’s behaviour reveals that she possesses some kind of implicit
attitude to the effect that the races are not intellectually equal. But why must one
accept that this attitude serves to block the actualisation of certain of her dispositions
to behave associated with her belief that the races are intellectually? Couldn’t the
proponent of VT maintain instead that Juliet’s implicit attitude prevents her from
possessing some of the dispositions associated with the belief that the races are
intellectually equal? I have maintained that Juliet has all of the dispositions to behave
associated with the belief that the races are intellectually equal but some of them are
not actualised. But why not maintain, as Schwitzgebel does, that she only possesses
some of the dispositions associated with the belief that the races are intellectually
equal, all of which are actualised? After all, if her implicit attitude can explain why
certain of Juliet’s dispositions to behave associated with her belief are not actualised,
could it not explain why she fails to possess them at all?9
First, it is far from obvious that a vague belief combined with a discordant
implicit attitude can adequately capture the normative conflict inherent in Juliet’s
case. Second, even if this interpretation were consistent with Juliet’s case, her case
still could not be understood to motivate VT. The belief-implicit attitude picture
provides us with an explanation as to how Juliet can behave as she does that is
consistent with her believing that the races are intellectually equal simpliciter. It
teaches us that we do not need to appeal to her belief’s being vague to understand
her behaviour.10
9 My thanks to Jonathan Way and Joseph Schear for both independently putting this idea to me.
10 Rowbottom (2016) has recently argued that the presence of certain attitudes, such as fears and desires
for example, or changes in mood, can cause changes in one’s dispositional profile qua believer at a certain
time (which he understands in terms of one’s degree of belief fluctuating). Perhaps Juliet’s implicit
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This completes my case against the idea that Juliet can be used to motivate VT.
Schwitzgebel treats Juliet’s case as a central motivating case for VT. Nonetheless,
the many different types of case that he cites as examples of vague belief form a rag
bag set. As I mentioned at the outset, he includes cases of partial forgetting, those
that involve Kripke’s Puzzle and many more besides. On my view, there is nothing
that unites all of these types of case. Nonetheless, I do think that there is a moral to
be extracted from my discussion of Juliet’s case, which generalises to some of the
other cases offered in support of VT. I have argued that Juliet’s behaviour—
similarly to that of the woman in Precipice—is naturally accounted for by
attributing to her two interacting states. My suspicion is that one of the features of
our mental life that VT fails to appreciate, generally speaking, is that at any given
time each person has an uncountably large number and a wide variety of mental
states, which, taken together, help explain their behaviour. If, per impossible, an
individual had only one belief, they would behave in a manner that was entirely in
keeping with what we would expect of someone who believed the content of that
belief (and only believed the content of that belief). But as human beings really are,
their implicit attitudes, fears, anxieties, hopes, etc. complicate the behavioural
output of their beliefs. Their complex behaviour does not support the conclusion
that it is vague whether or not they hold a certain belief. An individual who believes
that p will, more often than not, fail to present as a perfect exemplar of one who
believes that p simply in virtue of the fact that they have lots of other mental states
in addition to this belief that interact with the belief in lots of complicated ways.11
Footnote 10 continued
attitude changes which of the dispositions relevant to whether or not she believes that the races are
intellectually equal she possesses over time rather than merely blocking their actualisation. My thanks to
an anonymous referee for this journal for highlighting this interpretation of Juliet’s case. Similarly to
attributing Juliet a vague belief and an implicit attitude, it is unclear that attributing her a fluctuating
dispositional profile qua believer and an implicit attitude can capture her normative conflict and,
regardless, there is no need to appeal to such fluctuations when the belief-implicit attitude picture
adequately captures her case.
11 Rowbottom (2007, p. 135) makes this point with an adapted version of an example of Ryle’s (1949,
pp. 134–135):
‘‘[A] to be unhesitant in telling oneself and [B] others that it is thin, [C] in acquiescing in other
people’s assertions to that effect, [D] in objecting to statements to the contrary, [E] in drawing
consequences from the original proposition, and so forth. But it is also [F] to be prone to skate warily,
[G] to shudder, [H] to dwell in imagination on possible disasters and [I] to warn other skaters…
But now take the individual who has dispositions A, E, F, G, & H, yet not B, C, D, & I. A credible
explanation is that he is a nasty prankster who is sure that the ice is dangerously thin, but would delight in
seeing someone else fall through it!’’
The pattern present in this case suggests that it is not vague whether or not the person believes the ice
to be thin, but that they do believe this and intend to deceive others about the fact. As an anonymous
referee for this journal pointed out, if the person in question here did straightforwardly intend to deceive
others, this intention would show up in a more extensive description of their dispositions, including more
of their ‘internal’ dispositions in particular. The same may be true of the woman’s fear in Precipice, for
example, and of the relevant mental states in some of the other cases I am about to discuss. However, this
does not undermine the argument against VT that the cases as described already exhibit patterns that
undermine the motivation for the vague belief account—Rowbottom’s case already suggests that the
person believes and intends to deceive, for example.
3040 S. Archer
123
Consider Price’s example, with which I began, of someone who ordinarily avoids
walking under ladders but who, when about to miss their train, runs straight under
one without hesitation. Similarly to Juliet and the woman in Precipice, there is a
pattern in this person’s behaviour: it is only when it really matters—when pressed
for time, for example—that they will walk under a ladder, otherwise, they will avoid
doing so. VT alone has no resources to explain such a pattern. On my view, the
person in question believes that walking under ladders will do them no harm but
they also harbour a suspicion that it is unlucky to do so. Similarly, I think some of
Price’s (1969, pp. 307–312) examples of ‘Aesthetic Half-Belief’ are naturally
understood in terms of a belief plus another, complicating attitude. On my view,
someone who is ‘carried away’ by a play, for example, believes the action on stage
to be fictitious. As Price (1969, p. 311) notes:
When the heroine falls into the clutches of the villain, he does not rush out of
the theatre and ring up the police.
Nonetheless, he is imaginatively engaged with the play, such that he really cries for
the heroine’s sake, for example. Again, it is the combination of the belief that what
is taking place is fictitious and his imagining that it is not, which naturally captures
the precise pattern in his behaviour: why he behaves as if the events were taking
place in the respects he does and as if they were not in the respects he does. Cases
involving self-deception also seem better explicable in terms of several, interacting
states such as anxiety and suspicion, for example, as opposed to vague belief.12
4 VT from the first-person perspective
In the previous section, I argued that Juliet’s case, and those like it, fail to motivate
VT. I did not argue that such cases are incompatible with VT. Furthermore, for all I
say so far, it remains an open possibility that there is a case of another kind, which
might motivate VT. However, I will now argue that, not only is this not so, but that
VT is positively untenable.
VT emerges out of a particular philosophical tradition, which begins with Quine
(e.g. 1960) and progresses through Stitch (e.g. 1983), Davidson (e.g. 1984), and
Dennett (e.g. 1987), to name a few of its guiding participants. In this tradition,
philosophers remain firmly rooted in the third-person perspective when considering
what it is for someone to believe something. As we have seen, we are encouraged to
think about cases such as Juliet’s from an observer’s perspective and consider which
belief (if any) it is appropriate to attribute to the person in question. This is not to
say that only outwardly observable behaviour need be considered relevant to belief
attribution. As aforementioned, both Schwitzgebel and Price allow that dispositions
to behave ‘internally’ in certain ways, such as draw certain conclusions etc., are to
be included in the believer’s dispositional profile. But note that such internal
dispositions can be considered from the third-person perspective of the attributor
12 See Archer (2013) for a detailed discussion of self-deception.
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just as readily as those relating to outwardly observable behaviour. Furthermore,
they can be considered from the ‘third-person perspective’, as I am using the
expression, even by the believer themselves. So the distinction between the first and
third-person perspective on belief that I am drawing here is orthogonal to the
distinction between beliefs that can be attributed using the first-person in the
grammatical sense and beliefs that can only be attributed using the grammatical
third-person. Rather, it is a distinction that attempts to highlight the janus-faced
nature of belief itself. On the one hand, from the third-person perspective, a belief is
an item in the world, a psychological state that helps explain the believer’s
behaviour. On the other hand, from what I am calling the ‘first-person perspective’,
a belief is the believer’s view on the world: what the believer takes to be true. On
my view, these two faces are related. It is in virtue of understanding that someone’s
belief is what they take to be true that one can understand their behaving as they do.
Nonetheless, it is possible to focus on one face to the exclusion of the other.
Until now, I have concentrated on addressing VT on its own terms, from the
third-person perspective. I have argued that even on home ground, cases such as
Juliet’s fail to motivate VT. But any adequate account of belief clearly needs to
accommodate both of belief’s two faces. I will now argue that VT is unable to
accommodate the first-person perspective on belief, the sense in which one’s own
belief is what one takes to be true. It is this failure that ultimately undermines VT.
I will consider two questions which, by anybody’s lights, one can ask oneself
about one’s own beliefs. The first is what I will call the ‘Deliberative Question’—
whether to believe that p—and the second is what I will call the ‘Introspective
Question’—whether I believe that p.13 I will identify two difficulties for VT
generated by each of these questions.
Although most of our beliefs are not formed as the product of deliberation about
whether to believe something, we nonetheless have the capacity to form beliefs in
this way and we sometimes do. The first difficulty for VT I will discuss here stems
from the fact that deliberation concerning whether to believe that p necessarily has a
certain character. When one deliberates about whether to believe that p this question
necessarily strikes one as tantamount to the question whether p in the sense that
when one considers whether to believe that p, necessarily, it is immediately (non-
inferentially) obvious to one that this question is settled by, and only by, answering
the second question, whether p. Only epistemic considerations strike one as relevant
to whether to believe that p. If one is considering whether to believe that all swans
are white, for example, this question immediately strikes one as answerable only by
determining whether all swans are white. Following Shah (2003), this fact is
sometimes known as ‘transparency’. The question whether to believe that p is
described as ‘transparent’ to the question whether p.14
13 As will become clear, I do not intend the use of the term ‘introspective’ here to imply that I take self-
knowledge to involve any form of inner perception. Indeed, I will maintain that in conceptually primary
cases one answers the former question in virtue of answering the latter.
14 It is important to note that the transparency of doxastic deliberation is entirely compatible with the fact
that, outside of one’s conscious awareness, non-epistemic phenomena, such as what one wants to believe,
for example, can, and indeed often do, influence what one believes.
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Now, the transparency of deliberation concerning whether to believe that p is a
fact about what is psychologically possible in an aspect of our doxastic lives that
needs accommodating by any satisfactory picture of belief. The problem for VT is
that this transparency is a necessary constraint on beliefs formed via deliberation
concerning whether to believe that p. If one forms one’s belief in this way, one’s
deliberation is necessarily transparent. One can only consider epistemic consider-
ations pertinent to one’s question. This is in patent conflict with VT’s claim that
there is no necessary criterion for possessing any given belief. According to VT, it
should be possible for someone who satisfies all of the other envisaged criteria for
holding a certain belief, let’s say, to form a belief via deliberation concerning
whether to believe that p that is not transparent. They could consider non-epistemic
reasons such as what they want to believe, for example, as pertinent to their
deliberation. But this is not possible.
A second problem for VT emerges when we focus on the moment of concluding
one’s deliberation concerning whether to believe that p. On my view, one has three
options; one can conclude one’s deliberation:
1. By judging that ‘yes, p’, and therein forming the belief that p;
2. By judging that ‘no, * p’ and therein forming the belief that * p;
3. By withholding belief insofar as one judges one’s epistemic reasons to be
inconclusive on the matter.15
If VT were true, the deliberator themselves could understand that it can be vague
whether or not one believes something. Indeed, arguably they would understand this
simply in virtue of possessing the concept of belief, which they are employing.
Regardless, assuming a case in which the deliberator does understand that it can be
vague whether or not one believes something, a fourth option for concluding one’s
deliberation about whether to believe that p would be possible. One could conclude
one’s deliberation about whether to believe that p by somehow plumping for vague
belief. But what kind of assessment of one’s epistemic reasons would justify such a
conclusion? As per the transparency thesis I have just discussed, when one
concludes one’s deliberation about whether to believe that p by forming the belief
that p, one does so in virtue of answering the question whether p in the affirmative
and therein forming the belief that p. But what kind of answer to the question
whether p would enable one to form a vague belief? If one is unsure whether p this
justifies withholding belief, not the formation of a vague belief. So the second
difficulty with VT from the first-person perspective is that it requires the possibility
of what is in fact an unintelligible conclusion to deliberation concerning whether to
believe something.
Footnote 14 continued
See Archer (2017) for a defence of the transparency of doxastic deliberation.
15 There are certainly cases in which one concludes one’s deliberation about whether to believe that p by
thinking something like ‘I’m fairly sure that p’, for example. Being ‘fairly sure that p’ is arguably
formalisable as believing that p to a certain degree. If degrees of belief were a type of vague belief as
Schwitzgebel claims, VT would be coherent in the context of deliberation about whether to believe that p
in such cases. I set these kinds of cases aside here.
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The third problem for VT I will discuss here is generated by the Introspective
Question, whether I believe that p. Although, in accordance with VT, per
impossibile, the fourth possible conclusion just discussed would have to be available
to one deliberating about whether to believe that p, not all purported cases of vague
belief would involve the deliberator concluding their deliberation in this way.
Indeed, in the alleged case of vague belief we have been focused on, ex hypothesi,
Juliet ‘‘finds the case for racial equality compelling’’. Juliet straightforwardly forms
a conclusion of the form ‘yes, p’ when deliberating about whether to believe that p.
But as we have seen, according to VT, despite judging that p, Juliet does not therein
form the belief that p in so far as she fails to resemble one who believes that the
races are intellectually equal in other ways. So, according to VT, if Juliet considers
whether she believes that the races are intellectually equal—if she poses herself the
Introspective Question—she should think that it is vague whether or not she
believes that they are. As VT would have it, Juliet, like everyone else, is in a
position to recognise that her judgement that the races are intellectually equal is not
sufficient for her believing that they are. Judging that p is only one behavioural
output relevant to being classifiable as believing that p: it is neither necessary nor
sufficient for believing that p. So, according to VT, Juliet is in a position to think the
following Moore-paradoxical-like thought:
The races are intellectually equal, but I don’t believe that they are simpliciter;
it is vague whether or not I believe that they are.
Schwitzgebel (2010, p. 542) intimates that VT has this consequence and attempts to
minimise it as ‘‘linguistic unnaturalness’’, claiming that the unnaturalness of
traditional Moore-paradoxical statements arguably reflects pragmatic constraints on
speech.16 However, as Moran (2001, p. 70) points out, this cannot be a satisfactory
analysis of what is paradoxical about Moore-paradoxical statements as it is
paradoxical even to think ‘p, but I don’t believe it’, or, ‘I believe that p, but p is not
true’. The utterance of such a thought is not necessary for the generation of paradox.
Similarly, even thinking ‘p, but I don’t believe it simpliciter, it is vague whether or
not I believe it’ is paradoxical. VT is left owing an explanation of this
paradoxicality.
On my view, Moore paradoxicality is explicable in terms of a second kind of
transparency. This time, it is not the transparency between the Deliberative Question
(whether to believe that p) and whether p that is relevant, but the transparency
between the Introspective Question (whether I believe that p) and whether p. This
latter kind of introspective transparency has been much discussed in the self-
knowledge literature.17 According to ‘transparency’ theorists about self-knowledge,
the question whether I believe that p is transparent to the question whether p in the
sense that, in conceptually primary cases, the former question is answerable in
virtue of answering the latter question. Like deliberative transparency, introspective
transparency is explicable in terms of the thinker comprehending that what it is to
16 Searle (1969) (and others since) have explicitly propounded such a view.
17 See, for example, Moran (2001) and Boyle (2009).
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believe that p is to take p to be true. Roughly speaking, it is because the thinker
understands that whether they believe that p is a question about whether they take
p to be true that they can answer the former question in virtue of answering the
latter. Introspective transparency explains what is paradoxical in a thought of the
form ‘p, but I don’t believe it simpliciter, it is vague whether or not I believe it’. The
judgement that p implicitly contains the judgement that one believes that p
simpliciter. Hence a contradiction is generated when one adds ‘but I don’t believe
that p simpliciter’.
To claim that in conceptually primary cases one can answer the question whether
to believe that p in virtue of answering the question whether p is not to claim that in
all cases one knows that one believes that p simply in virtue of judging that p. If this
were so, we could have made short shrift of Juliet’s case. There would have been no
doubt that she believes that the races are intellectually equal insofar as—ex
hypothesi—she judges this to be the case. Rather, one who believes that p is of
course answerable for one’s behaviour taken as a whole, as I have already
emphasised. In Juliet’s case, I have argued that the pattern in her behaviour renders
it plausible that she does believe that p in spite of her behaviour that suggests
otherwise, which is to be explained in terms of a belief-discordant implicit attitude.
Nonetheless, an explanation of her conflicting behaviour is required. And this
explanation is required from Juliet’s own perspective: to claim that in conceptually
primary cases one can answer the question whether I believe that p in virtue of
answering the question whether p is not to claim that this is the only way one can
come to know about what one believes. As aforementioned, one can treat one’s own
behaviour as evidence regarding what one believes just as much as anyone else can.
What is important for explaining why we baulk at Moore-paradoxical claims is
that transparent self-knowledge of one’s beliefs is what we expect of others and
ourselves under ordinary circumstances. We expect that one have a certain kind of
distinctively first-personal self-knowledge with respect to one’s own beliefs. That is,
self-knowledge that is had immediately—without appealing to evidence—and
authoritatively—in a way that is not prone to the same kinds of mistakes that one is
prone to when attributing beliefs to others. But more fundamentally, we expect self-
knowledge of one’s own beliefs that is non-spectatorial. One is not a mere spectator
vis-a`-vis one’s own belief but rather the author of it: in consciously believing that p,
one therein appreciates the reasons for which one believes that p.18
This brings me to the fourth difficulty for VT I will discuss, which concerns
whether the capacity for such transparent self-knowledge is compatible with VT.
One might think that, according to VT, in order to know that one believes that p one
must always adopt the third-person perspective on oneself. One must always
consider whether or not one resembles a believer to a sufficient extent in order to
know whether or not one is one. However, Schwitzgebel (2011) maintains that one
does have the capacity to know whether or not one believes that p simply by
reflecting on whether p. On his view, this is one method (amongst several) for
coming to know whether one believes something. Of course, according to
18 Moran (see e.g. 2001, p. 33) has emphasised the fundamentality of this feature of self-knowledge.
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Schwitzgebel, in cases such as Juliet’s transparency fails. That is, Juliet reflects on
whether or not the races are intellectually equal, judges that they are and yet does
not come to know that she believes that they are simpliciter (because she does not
believe this simpliciter). Nonetheless, he maintains that transparency is an
‘empirically reliable’ process for coming to know what one believes, just as vision
is a reliable process for coming to know certain facts about the world, despite one’s
susceptibility to visual illusions on occasion. However, it is unclear why
transparency would be a reliable process for coming to know what one believes
if it were not for the conceptual connection between judging and believing that I
outlined above. The analogy with vision seems implausible. Vision would
presumably be understood to be a reliable process for coming to know certain
facts about the world in virtue of the manner in which the visual system is, as a
matter of empirical fact, connected up with the rest of the world. But are we to
conceive of judgements as simply connected up with beliefs in an analogously brute
manner? Insofar as we are, the non-spectatorial aspect of one’s first-personal self-
knowledge of one’s beliefs is certainly lost. On Schwitzgebel’s ‘empirical’ picture
of the connection between judging and believing, when one moves from ‘p’ to ‘I
believe that p’, one does so in virtue of one’s alienated appreciation that judgements
typically issue in beliefs under the right kind of circumstances. One does not do so
in virtue of one’s appreciation of one’s reasons for believing that p.19
In sum, VT cannot accommodate the first-person perspective on belief; it cannot
accommodate the fact that what one believes is what one takes to be true. Symptoms
of this fact pop up all over the place. I have discussed four. VT cannot accommodate
the necessity of deliberative transparency; it makes little sense in the context of
considering what it would be to conclude one’s deliberation concerning whether to
believe that p; it cannot capture what is paradoxical about Moore’s Paradox (or
Moore-paradoxical-like phenomena); and it seems unable to properly account for
our capacity for distinctly first-personal self-knowledge.
Price (1969, p. 302) tacitly acknowledges the tension between VT and the first-
person perspective on belief when he says:
Sometimes we even say such things about ourselves, usually in the past tense.
‘I see now that at that time I only half-believed what he told me.’ (my italics)
His ‘‘usually in the past tense’’ qualification is revelatory of his unease. I hope I
have gone some way here towards spelling out the extent to which unease is
justified.
5 Conclusion
VT claims that ‘believes’ is a vague predicate. According to VT, fairly often, the
most accurate description of someone’s state we can give is to say that it is vague
whether or not they believe something. Cases such as Juliet’s are supposed to
19 My thanks to Schwitzgebel for correspondence regarding this matter.
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motivate this conclusion. I have been concerned to show that VT is false. I began by
taking VT on its own terms and considering how successful an account of Juliet’s
case it provides from the third-person perspective. I argued that there is a pattern in
Juliet’s behaviour, indicative of the normatively problematic nature of her situation,
which merely claiming it to be vague whether or not she believes that the races are
intellectually equal fails to capture. This pattern, I maintained, is suggestive of
Juliet’s believing that the races are intellectually equal yet, in addition, possessing a
belief-discordant implicit attitude otherwise. I acknowledged that the pattern is not
incompatible, from the third-person perspective, with its being vague whether or not
Juliet believes the races to be intellectually equal in addition to her having an
implicit attitude to the opposite effect. Nonetheless, I argued, Juliet’s case fails to
motivate VT. Furthermore, I pointed out some of Price’s and Schwitzgebel’s other
cases that appear to fail to motivate VT for similar reasons to Juliet. However, I left
it open, at this point, that VT might still be motivated by a case I had not considered.
But I then argued that it is when we attempt to take VT seriously from the first-
person perspective on belief that it becomes clear that it is not only unmotivated, but
untenable. VT cannot accommodate the necessity of deliberative transparency; it
makes little sense in the context of considering what it would be to conclude one’s
deliberation concerning whether to believe that p; it cannot capture what is
paradoxical about Moore’s Paradox; and it seems unable to properly account for our
capacity for distinctly first-personal self-knowledge.
Belief is janus-faced. On the one hand, a belief is the believer’s view on the
world: what they take to be true. On the other, a belief is an item in the world, a
psychological state that helps explain the believer’s behaviour. VT was designed
with only the second of these two faces in mind and hence is not fit for the purpose
of accommodating both as any satisfactory account of belief must.
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